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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FEDERAL FINANCIAL COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
MI RANCHITA d/b/a GUADALAHARA) 
GRILL and MANUEL T. ARMENTA as) 
guarantor, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 990151-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from a final order entered on January 22, 1999, denying a motion by 
Defendants/Appellant, Manuel T. Armenta, for order vacating and setting aside the 
judgment filed on April 14, 1998, and amended on May 7, 1998. This appeal is also from 
the amended order entered on February 1, 1999, denying the motion to vacate. Under the 
authority vested in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, this case was poured over to the 
Court of Appeals for disposition. This court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§78-2-2(3)0 and 78-2-2(4) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that Defendants' Motion to Vacate was 
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untimely? 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that Defendants' Motion must be denied due 
to Defendants' lack of diligence in communicating with his attorney and 
pursing his rights in the action? 
3. Was the Defendant denied due process? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Defendants' Motion constituted a Rule 
60(b)(1), URCP, motion rather than a Rule 60(b)(6), URCP, motion is a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. See Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. DT 
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992). 
Whether the Defendant is barred from setting aside the judgment based upon 
Defendants' lack of diligence in pursuing the case and communicating with his attorney uner 
Rule 60(b) is subject to the standard that the trial court has considerable discretion in ruling 
on a Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment under Rule 60(b) and the appellate court will 
reverse the trial court only where there is a clear abuse of discretion. See Gardiner and 
Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982); Mayhaw v. Standard Gillsonite 
Company, 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 1962). 
Whether Defendant was denied due process regarding service of the Notice to 
Appoint Counsel when Plaintiffs counsel served Notice to Appoint Counsel under Rule 4-
506(3) to Defendants' last known address shown by Defendants withdrawing counsel is a 
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question of fact which is reviewed for supporting evidence. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 5(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) Service: How made and by whom. 
(1) . . .Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering 
a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if no address is 
known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court . . . 
Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the signed judgment 
shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in 
Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the 
requirement of this provision. 
Rule 60(b) 1) and (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect... 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2) or 
(3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken . . . 
Rule 4-506(3), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
If an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, the withdrawing attorney must 
serve written notice of the withdrawal upon the client of the withdrawing 
attorney and upon all other parties not in default. A certificate of service must 
be filed with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal 
shall include a notification of the trial date. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case centers around Defendant Armenta's motion made to the trial court to set 
aside a summary judgment issued by the trial court. The summary judgment was issued 
because Defendants had not answered request for admissions for a period of 10 months after 
the request for admissions were propounded and served on Defendants. The Plaintiff had 
obtained an order of the trial court compelling Defendants to answer this discovery, which 
remained unanswered and served as the basis for the default summary judgment. Defendant 
alleges that the negligence or misconduct of his attorney in not responding to the motions 
before the court and supplying affidavits caused Defendant to suffer a lack of due process. 
Further, the Defendant raises procedural questions alleging that the Notice to Appoint 
Counsel, which is required to be filed under Rule 4-506(3), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, was improperly served at an address which is not his home address. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs counsel served the Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Notice of Entry of Judgment at an improper address which Defendant asserts is 
a factor in determining whether he should be relieved from the Judgment. 
Plaintiff asserts that the Notice to Appoint Counsel and Notice of Judgment were 
properly served at Defendant's last known address, as indicated by the Withdrawal of 
Counsel Certificate of Service filed by Defendants withdrawing counsel. Plaintiff argues 
that the trial court had overwhelming reason and evidence to conclude that Defendant failed 
to act diligently, after seventeen (17) months of failure to respond to discovery, and by 
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failing to communicate or contact his attorney for at least ten (10) months following his 
second counsel's withdrawal from the case. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the Utah case law 
regarding attorney negligence and the negligence of the Defendant in pursuing his or her 
own rights, is clearly within the confines of Rule 60(b)(1), URCP, and subject to the three 
month filing requirement for motions for relief from judgments under said subsection. 
Armenta failed to file his Motion for Relief from the judgment within the appropriate time 
period and his motion is time barred. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the Defendants on February 5, 1997, for 
breach of an equipment lease. R. 1-6. Defendant Armenta engaged counsel who filed an 
answer on behalf of Armenta on June 6,1997. R. 36-37. Defendants' counsel withdrew on 
July 29, 1997. R. 40-41. Plaintiffs counsel filed a notice to appoint counsel or appear in 
person on August 1, 1997. R. 41-42. Defendant Armenta engaged new counsel, Steve 
Russell, to assist him in the action. Prior to the withdrawal of Mr. Armenta's first counsel, 
Armenta was served with discovery requests on July 25, 1997. R. 39. Plaintiff filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, or In The Alternative, To Compel on September 1, 1997. 
R. 45-48. On October 1,1997, Armenta's new counsel filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 49-51. After reviewing the summary 
judgment motion, the trial court granted the Motion to Compel but denied the summary 
judgment without prejudice on October 21, 1997. R. 66-68. Defendant Armenta failed 
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thereafter to answer the Plaintiffs discovery as required by the trial court's order compelling 
Defendant to do so. 
On January 12, 1998, Armenta's second attorney, Steve Russell, filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal of Counsel. R. 76-77. Plaintiffs counsel thereafter filed a notice to appoint 
counsel on January 20, 1998, and served said notice to appoint counsel on Defendant 
Armenta at the address indicated in the said Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. Plaintiff 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 29, 1998, based upon the Defendants' 
failure to deny the request for admissions. R. 82-86. The motion was granted two months 
later on March 25, 1998. R. 92-93. On April 23, 1998, Plaintiff served a Notice of Entry 
of Judgment to Armenta at the address in the said Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. R. 98-
99. Plaintiff personally served Armenta with a Supplemental Order on August 28, 1998. 
R. 108-109. 
On November 4, 1998, ten months after Armenta's second counsel withdrew, 
Defendant Armenta engaged new counsel to enter a Notice of Appearance. R. 114-115. 
Armenta filed a Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the Summary Judgment on November 16, 
1999. R. 116-117. On January 4, 1999, (R. 295-297), the trial court ruled on Armenta's 
Motion to Set Aside or Vacate by denying said motion and issued a Minute Entry, which 
was followed by the entry of a final Order dated January 22, 1999. R. 301-303. The 
Armenta filed a Notice of Appeal seeking to set aside the trial court's Order denying the 
Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the Summary Judgment. R. 307-308. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court properly ruled that the Armenta's Motion to Vacate or Set 
Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is governed by Rule 60(b)(1), and thus 
bears a three month statutory time limit on filing. Mr. Armenta's motion to 
set aside the judgment is thus time barred. 
2. Regardless of whether the motion is viewed by the court as being under Rule 
60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(6), the Defendant Armenta's failure to communicate 
with counsel, participate in the case, or assert his rights for seventeen (17) 
months bars equitable relief under Rule 60(b). 
3. With regard to Defendant Armenta's assertion that Plaintiffs counsel failed 
to comply with Rule 4-506(3), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Notice 
to Appoint Counsel and Notice of Judgment, Plaintiff maintains that counsel 
properly served Armenta both notices at Armenta's last known address as 
established by the Notice of Withdrawal filed by Armenta's withdrawing 
counsel, Mr. Russell, and thus Mr. Armenta was not deprived of due process. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE WAS TIME BARRED UNDER RULE 60(B)(1) URCP. 
This case involves the typical unsuccessful attempt by a judgment debtor to avoid the 
three month time limitation for filing motions to set aside default judgments under Rule 
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60(b)(1) URCP. Mr. Armenta is alleging that the facts fit within the exception to the three 
month rule under Rule 60(b)(6), URCP, [formerly Rule 60(b)(7), URCP]. The Utah 
Appellate Courts have consistently rejected this approach where the Defendant bases his 
request for relief on the negligence of his attorney. Further, the Utah Appellate Courts have 
consistently imposed the three month rule where the Defendant has been negligent in 
pursuing his rights, has failed to contact counsel or participate in the case. 
Armenta complains that his attorney, Steven Russell, opposed the Plaintiffs Motion 
to Compel Discovery in a seriously incompetent manner, and in conjunction therewith, filed 
an Affidavit purportedly fraudulently signed by Armenta's son. Armenta's Brief continues 
stating that his attorney, Mr. Russell, did not give a copy of the discovery requests to the 
Defendant. There is no question that the gravamen of Armenta's request for relief from the 
judgment is his attorneys' misconduct and incompetence. 
It has long been established in the Utah Courts that the negligence, inadvertence and 
misconduct of the attorney are imputed to the client under basic principals of agency and that 
the client is bound by the misconduct of his attorney. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1984). Armenta tries to remove himself from this clear Utah law, [that the Appellant 
is bound by the actions of his attorney], by alleging that his attorney's conduct was gross 
negligence or severe incompetence. Nevertheless, the Appellants' position is not supported 
by Utah law. Based upon the Russell case, Utah follows the general rule that the Defendant 
is bound by the actions of his attorney, even if they are inadvertent, negligent, or amount to 
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misconduct. Armenta inappropriately cites the case of Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74 
(Utah 1973), for the proposition that Rule 60(b)(7), URCP, [now Rule 60(b)(6), URCP,] 
allows relief for attorney inadvertence and negligence. In Stewart an attorney was 
incapacitated because he was suspended from practicing law, and thus the Russell doctrine 
would not apply. Stewart thus does not overturn Russell Armenta's argument is 
inappropriate here. The term "incapacitated" refers to disbarment, suspension, serious 
illness of the attorney which shows lack of due process. This is not to be confused with 
"incompetence", which results from misconduct, negligence and inadvertence within the 
Russell rule and which are subject to the Rule 60(b)(1), URCP, three month filing 
requirement. 
Armenta cites Bish 's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 359 P.2d21 (Utah 1961). This case 
does not apply because it involves only the issue of filing a timely appeal. Armenta also 
cites Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA Development Corp., 64 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
However, in Interstate, the withdrawing attorney admitted he may not have sent the notice 
of withdrawal, and the defendant acted within three weeks of the trial to set aside. Thus, In 
Interstate, the defendant was timely under Rule 60(b)(3), URCP, unlike Armenta who 
waited ten months. 
Appellant's argument was rejected by the court in Richins v. Delbert Chipman and 
Sons, Inc., 817 P.2d 382 (Utah App. 1991). In Richins, the Defendant argued that his 
counsel acted in an ill-advised manner, did not function adequately and was impaired. The 
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Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's determination that the judgment should not be set 
aside, holding that the relief sought was correctly characterized as being pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(1), URCP, and further emphasized that the ineffective assistance of counsel is a Sixth 
Amendment right which is limited to criminal law. Thus, the Appellants' argument in the 
instant case that he has been denied due process is not a legal or valid argument in a civil 
case under Rule 60(b), URCP. 
In Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982) the Supreme 
Court dealt with a situation very similar to the instant case. The Defendant claimed that his 
attorney failed to communicate with him concerning discovery documents, and alleged that 
his attorneys' conduct constituted an abandonment justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(7), 
URCP. The court rejected this theory, and reiterated that Rule 60(b)(7), URCP may not be 
used to circumvent the time limit of Rule 60(b)(1), URCP, relating to attorney misconduct, 
inadvertence and negligence. 
Similarly, in Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. DT Southern Properties, 838 
P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the Defendant's excuse that 
his attorney neglected to file pleadings and that he mistakenly relied on the attorney's 
assurances clearly fall within Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 60, URCP and that the Defendants 
filing of the motion after the three month period was untimely. 
In summary, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that subdivision (b)(6), 
of Rule 60, URCP, relating to equitable relief from judgments, cannot be used for relief 
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based upon attorney mistake, inadvertence, misconduct or negligence. See Pitts v. 
McLachan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977); Caulder Brothers Company v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 
922 (Utah 1982); Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 565 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982); 
Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984); Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984); 
Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Association, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). Thus, the 
Appellants' position is misguided and contrary to clearly establish Utah case law. Mr. 
Armenta was not denied due process in this action. Mr. Armenta has no excuse with the trial 
court, which has provided him due process. 
POINT II 
ARMENTA'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
MUST BE REJECTED BECAUSE OF ARMENTA'S LACK OF DILIGENCE 
AND NEGLIGENCE. 
Judge Henriod found and incorporated in his Order a finding that "the Defendant 
is responsible for failing to remain in contact with his attorney who was representing 
him through the Motion for Summary Judgment in this case." The court further found 
that "most of the reasons advanced by the Defendant in support of his Motion to Set 
Aside are matters that were within the control of the Defendant for which the 
Defendant bears the sole responsibility in terms of his lack of knowledge of what was 
going on in this case." R. 304-305. These findings clearly constitute a determination by 
Judge Henriod that the Defendant Armenta was negligent in not communicating with his 
attorney, or following through with his obligation to participate in the legal proceedings 
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which had been going on for over seventeen (17) months prior to Armenta's filing of his 
Motion for Relief from the judgment. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. DT 
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992), reviewed a case similar to the case at 
issue. The Appellate Court ruled that the failure to act seasonably by the Defendant, and the 
Defendants' failure to use due diligence in pursuing his own rights in the action bars 
equitable relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b), URCP. The Lincoln decision further 
held that the inadvertence, neglect and failure to act on part of the Defendant falls within 
Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 60, URCP, and thus the three month statutory requirement is 
imposed on the Defendant. 
The lack of due diligence by Armenta is uncontroverted. The record shows that he 
had at least two attorneys who withdrew from the action due to his failure to cooperate. He 
failed to contact his last attorney for a period often (10) months after Mr. Russell withdrew. 
The record further reflects that Armenta condoned the filing of affidavits by his son bearing 
forged signatures purporting to be his. The underlying defense Armenta makes is that one 
of his sons forged his signature on the equipment lease to begin with. Prior to bringing the 
Motion for Relief from the judgment, the action was active for over seventeen (17) months. 
This obviously was not a situation where Armenta entered the action within a couple of 
months after a default was entered against him. His attorneys withdrew because Armenta 
failed to cooperate with his counsel in answering discovery. Furthermore, Armenta's 
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admissions that his counsel was negligent and guilty of misconduct in proceeding on 
motions and discovery answers shows Armenta's own failure to involve himself or 
participate in discovery. The discovery was served on Armenta in July, 1997, prior to 
withdrawal of his first attorney. Despite knowing of the discovery since July, 1997, 
Armenta and his new counsel took no action to answer the discovery for a seventeen (17) 
month period despite an order of the trial court compelling Armenta to answer. One would 
think that if Mr. Armenta were challenging the lease that he would be fully participating in 
discovery to prove up his defense of fraud or forgery. Instead he sat idly back. Armenta 
now alleges that he was diligently pursuing his rights when he was not. Judge Henriod did 
not buy Armenta's assertion. 
In Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982), the 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's rejection of the Defendants' claim that he was 
abandoned by his attorney, that his attorney failed to communicate with him during a 
discovery process and that the attorney failed to forward copies of discovery documents to 
the Defendant. The Supreme Court stated that "the real problem was that the record 
showed that the failure to communicate was not entirely the negligence of the attorney, 
but rather the negligence on the part of the Defendant for failure to communicate with 
his attorney." The court ruled that a Motion to Set Aside was clearly within Rule 60(b)(1), 
URCP and held that Defendants claim under Rule 60(b)(7), URCP [now Rule 60(b)(6), 
URCP], was inapplicable. The court rejected the Defendants' argument that the negligence 
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of his attorney and abandonment by his attorney should not be imputed to him and was not 
supportable based upon the Defendants' own failure to communicate with his attorney and 
participate in the action. 
Defendant Armenta falls within the holding of the Gardiner decision. The trial judge 
is in the best position to judge the circumstances of the Defendants' neglect, being involved 
with the parties' actions, the pleadings, and motions. As stated in Gardiner, "the trial court 
has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment under Rule 
60(b), URCP, and this Court [Appellate Court] will reverse the trial court only where an 
abuse of discretion is shown." 656 P.2d at 429. Judge Henriod's determination that 
Armenta failed to contact his attorney [for a ten (10) month period] together with his lack 
of participation in discovery for seventeen (17) months is fully supported by the record. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL SERVED NOTICES ON ARMENTA AS 
LEGALLY REQUIRED. ARMENTA WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE 
PROCESS. 
Plaintiffs counsel properly served a Notice to Appoint Counsel [under Rule 4-
506(3), Utah Code of Judicial Administration and a Notice of Entry of Judgment [under 
Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] , by serving the same on Armenta at the 
address provided by Armenta's withdrawing counsel. Mr. Armenta claims that the Notice 
to Appoint Counsel and Notice of Judgment served by Plaintiff were defective because they 
were not served to Mr. Armenta at what he claims to be his home address. Nevertheless, this 
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issue is resolved in Plaintiffs favor under Rule 5(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which governs and specifically directs how service of pleadings and papers are made after 
the action is proceeding. Rule 5(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states that "service 
upon an attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to 
the last known address." Therefore, Plaintiffs obligation to serve a Notice to Appoint 
Counsel and Notice of Judgment was to serve said notices on Mr. Armenta at the last known 
address provided to the court and to the Plaintiffs counsel. In this instance, the last known 
address is the address indicated by Mr. Russell in his Certificate of Service attached to the 
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. R. 78-79. 
Plaintiffs counsel served Armenta with both the Notice to Appoint and Notice of 
Judgment at his last known address. Plaintiffs counsel is not required to do a skip trace, to 
guess at what the Defendant's address is, or to question the certificate of the Defendants 
withdrawing counsel. Rule 4-506(3), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, requires the 
withdrawing counsel to file a notice of withdrawal, serve the defendant and file a Certificate 
of Service. Rule 4-506(3), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, thus sets the procedure 
for notice to a defendant and Plaintiffs counsel should be able to rely on the withdrawing 
counsel's certificate of service and designation of address for the defendant under this 
procedure. Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to rely under Rule 11, URCP, on the withdrawing 
counsel's certificate as being filed in good faith after due diligence. It is the obligation of 
Mr. Armenta to inform the court, the parties, and his counsel as to what his current address 
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is. In this instance, if Mr. Russell negligently represented an incorrect address of Mr. 
Armenta, his action is against his former counsel, and falls within the same rule expressed 
in Russell v. Martell, supra, that the client is bound by the actions of his attorney, who serves 
as the client's agent, even if the attorney is negligent. 
The burden should be on defendant and his withdrawing counsel and the notice of 
procedure of Rule 4-506(3), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, should be reliable to the 
plaintiff, who is not in the position to question or know of an improper status on 
Defendant's address in the notice of withdrawal. Plaintiffs counsel should be entitled to 
rely on the representation of the withdrawing attorney, who presumably corresponds with 
his client, sends him bills, and when his representation breaks down, serves on his client a 
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. The fact that a pleading may have an incorrect address, 
when filed by the client's own attorney, estoppes the client from challenging the address 
represented by his agent, his withdrawing attorney. Further, Mr. Armenta's actions, by 
failing to communicate with his attorney and participate in the action created the situation 
and any negligence of the attorney should attributed to Armenta. 
In summary, Plaintiff properly filed the Notice to Appoint Counsel and Notice of 
Judgment properly served said notices to Armenta's last known address, which was the 
address indicated by Mr. Armenta's withdrawing counsel. Federal Financial thus complied 
with the rules. Any difficulties experienced by Mr. Armenta should be born by him because 
of his failure to communicate with his attorney, his failure to participate in the action, and 
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because his attorney's actions are binding upon him. 
Armenta has questioned the timing on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Notice to Appoint Counsel was given on January 20, 1998, and the Motion for Summary 
Judgment made on January 29. However, no judgment was entered until April 14, 1998. 
Between the time of the making of the motion and the entry of the judgment, Armenta had 
almost three (3) months time to oppose the Motion but did not. The pursuit of the Motion 
for Summary Judgment less than 20 days after the Notice to Appoint Counsel is, therefore, 
a harmless error. Under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, no error is ground 
for disturbing a judgment unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice. The timing of the Motion for Summary Judgment is a harmless 
error and the judgment should not be disturbed pursuant to Rule 61. 
Armenta has insinuated that Federal Financial purposely delayed pursuing this 
judgment for more than 90 days so the three month rule under Rule 60(b), URCP, might 
apply to the judgment. However, the record defies this argument. A Notice of Entry of 
Judgment was given to the Defendant on April 27, 1998. R. 98-99. The Notice used the 
court's last listed address of the Defendant. This Notice was given just 12 days after the 
original entry of the judgment. The Defendant received further notice on May 7, 1998 of 
the original entry of the judgment by being served an Amended Order of Summary 
Judgment. R. 102-104. Federal Financial also issued a Motion and Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings less than one month after the entry of the judgment. R. 105-106. The record 
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shows that Federal Financial made significant and immediate efforts to pursue its judgment. 
A new Supplemental Order was issued on August 12,1998 and was personally served 
on Armenta on August 28, 1998. R. 108-109. The Supplemental Order is also a Notice of 
the Entry of Judgment. Armenta thereafter delayed almost three (3) months before filing the 
Motion upon which this appeal is based. R. 116-117. That delay by the Defendant in and 
of itself is a fatal lack of diligence under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is replete with lack of diligence on the part of Defendant Armenta. He 
failed to participate in the proceedings for seventeen (17) months. He failed to communicate 
at all with counsel for at least ten (10) months after his second counsel, Steve Russell, 
withdrew from the case. The facts reveal that there has been a potential fraud on the court 
by virtue of the allegation by Armenta that his son improperly submitted false affidavits with 
Armenta's attorney in connection with motions before the court. The trial court correctly 
concluded that the Defendant's ability to answer the discovery, which was served even prior 
to the withdrawal of his first counsel and remained unanswered for seventeen (17) months, 
was within the control of Defendant Armenta. Likewise, the ability of Armenta to 
communicate with his attorney was not impaired and he admittedly failed to communicate 
for at least ten (10) months after the withdrawal of his second attorney on the case. That too 
was within Mr. Armenta's control. 
The trial court's determination, which was based upon clear evidence of negligence 
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both by the Defendant Armenta and/or his counsel, overwhelmingly supports a conclusion 
that Defendant did not act diligently. The trial court's determination, which is based upon 
the trial court's better viewed position of knowing the parties, the pleadings, the actions of 
the parties and the context of the proceedings and the facts before the court, should not be 
overturned absent the clear abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 
Armenta's excuse that he was not served at his home address with the Notice to 
Appoint Counsel and the Notice of Judgment is not legally supportable. Rule 5, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, requires that Plaintiffs counsel serve the Defendant at his last known 
address, which is clearly established by the withdrawing counsel's certificate of service 
giving notice to both the Defendant and to Plaintiffs counsel. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' appeal should be dismissed and the decision 
of the trial court should be upheld, finding that Armenta failed to act diligently and is time 
barred from obtaining relief from the Default Summary Judgment. 
Dated this ^ day of June, 1999. / ? 
BryaflfW/ Cannon 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellee 
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